

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BRASILIA 1422

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (CHRISTOPHER, WARREN) PFOR PARM ENRG BR
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VISIT: PRESS HANDLING AND PROSPECTIVE

REF: STATE 039032, PARA 4

1. WE STONGLY RECOMMEND THAT DEPUTY SECRETARY GIVE NO FORMAL PRESS CONFERENCE DURING VISTI TO BRAZIL AND NO ARRIVAL OR DEPARTURE STATEMENTS. WE ASSUME THAT THERE WILL BE SOME AGREEEMENT DURING TALKS AS TO WHAT PRESS WILL BE TOLD AFTERWARD.
2. THE DEPUTY SECRETARY CAN EXPECT TO ENCOUNTER THE PRESS IN BOTH RIO AND BRASILIA AND WE HAVE PROVIDED BELOW LIST OF PROBING QUESTIONS OF SORT PRESS HERE IS MOST LIKELY TO ASK IF THE OCCASSION ARISES. WE WOULD RECCOMEND THAT NEITHER DEPUTY SECRETARY OR ANY MEMBER OF HIS PARTY TALK TO THE PRESS IN RIO. WE WOULD THINK IT PARTICULARLY ADVISEABLE THAT THERE BE NO COMMENTS OR STATEMTNS BY US OFFICIALS ON THE BILATERAL RELATIONASHIP UNTIL THE DEPUTY SECRETARY HAS HAD THE CHANCE TO MAKE THEM TO SILVEIRA. IN RIO, DEPUTY SECRETARY AND PARTY CAN BEG OFF PRESS QUESTIONS AND RESPECT SENSITIVITIES OF GOB BYY MAKING POINT THAT THEY ARE NOT OFFICIALLY IN BRAZIL UNTIL
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THEY ARRIVE IN BRASILIA, THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT.

3. THE RANGE OF POSSILBE PRESS QUESTIONS IS VIRTUALLY UNLIMITED SINCE REPORTERS, AT LEAST OF LARGER BRAZILIAN DAILIES HAVE GLOBAL INTERESTS AND WILL BE INTERESTED IN DEPUTY SECRETARY'S VIEWS ON DIVERSE ASPECTS OF US FOREIGN POLICY NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO BRAZIL,SUCH AS MIDDLE EAST, RELATIONS WITH

THE SOVIET UNION, PANAMA, CUBA, PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA, OR CIA BRIBE ALLEGATIONS. IN BRAZIL-SPECIFIC TERMS WE WOULD EXPECT DETAILED QUESTIONING IN AREAS OF NUCLEAR ACCORD, THE FUTURE OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND HIGH LEVEL VISIT, TRADE PROBLEMS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, WITH NUCLEAR CONCERNS DOMINATING. AS THE DEPARTMENT READS SOME OF THE MORE GENERAL QUESTIONS BELOW, IT WILL APPRECIATE THAT SOME OF THEM ENCOMPASS A VARIETY OF OTHER DERIVATIVE QUESTIONS.

4. POSSIBLE NUCLEAR QUESTIONS TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY WOULD BE: A. WHY HAVE YOU COME TO BRAZIL? WILL YOU (OR HAVE YOU) DISCUSSED THE BRAZIL-FRG NUCLEAR ACCORD WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA? IF DISCUSSION DEALT WITH THE "GLOBAL ASPECTS OF NONPROLIFERATION," HOW WAS THE US CONCERN OVER THE FRG-BRAZIL NUCLEAR ACCORD TREATED IN THAT CONTEXT? IS YOUR VISIT RELATED IN ANY WAY TO THE VISIT ON FEB 20-21 OF THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER?

B. THE BRAZILIAN POSITION IS THAT PROLIFERATION REFERS TO THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? IN THE VIEW, WHAT DOES THE TERM "PROLIFERATION" ENCOMPASS?

C. IN YOUR DISCUSSION WITH THE GOB, DID YOU (OR WILL YOU) SET A FIRM DATE FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY VANCE TO BRAZIL? IN SUCH A VISIT WOULD SECRETARY VANCE ALSO SEEK TO DISCUSS THE FRG-BRAZIL NUCLEAR ACCORD?

D. ON WHAT LEGAL GROUNDS CAN THE US JUSTIFY SEEKING TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN OR INTERFERE WITH AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO SOVEREIGN STATES SUCH AS THE FRG-BRAZIL NUCLEAR ACCORD?

E. PRESIDENT CARTER AND OTHERS HAVE STATED THAT THE US IS OPPOSED TO THE TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY FROM THE CONFIDENTIAL

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FRG TO BRAZIL FOR ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING. WHAT KIND OF COMPENSATION IS THE US PREPARED TO OFFER BRAZIL IF IT WILL NOT EXERCISE ITS RIGHT TO RECEIVE THE SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY? WHAT AREAS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND BRAZIL MIGHT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED IF BRAZIL INSISTS ON CONCLUDING THE DEAL? WHAT AREAS OF US COOPERATION WITH THE FRG MIGHT BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED IF THE FRG INSISTS ON LIVING UP TO ITS AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL?

F. WERE THERE CONSULTATION WITH THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT ABOUT THE FRG-BRAZIL NUCLEAR ACCORD BEFORE VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE VISITED BONN TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE WITH THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT? WAS THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT INFORMED BEFORE HAND THAT THE VICE PRESIDENT WOULD DISCUSS THIS ISSUE IN GERMANY?

G. IT HAS BEEN ALLEGED FREQUENTLY THAT THE BASIS FOR THE US CONCERN OVER THE FRG -BRAZIL NUCLEAR ACCORD IS THE DESIRE TO REGAIN FOR US INDUSTRY THE 6BILLION DEAL CAPTURED BY THE GERMANS. PLEASE COMMENT ON THAT ASSERTION. WOULD THE US PERMIT THE TRANSFER OF SIMILAR SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY TO BRAZIL IF THE SUPPLIERS WERE US RATHER THAN GERMAN FIRMS? WIL THE

US ENCOURAGE US FIRMS TO RENEW THEIR EFFORTS TO GAIN BRAZIL'S
BUSINESS IN THE EVENT THE AGREEMENT WITH FRG IS CANCELLED?

H. THE UNITED STATES SEEMS NOW TO BE SAYING THAT SAFE-
GUARDS ARE NOT AN ADEQUATE MEANS OF CONTROL OVER SENSITIVE
TECHNOLOGIES. DOESN'T THIS, IN EFFECT DESTROY THE NPT UNDER
WHICH CONTROL OVER THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF SIGNATORIES DEPENDS
ENTIELY ON SAFEGUARDS ADMINISTERED BY THE IAEA?

I. WOULD THE US ACCEPT BRAZIL'S SIGNING THE NPT OR
ACCEPTANCE OF ULL SCOPE SAFEGUARDS AS A CONDITION FOR
OBTAINING ENRICHMENTS AND REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGIES? WHAT IS
IT THAT THE US WANTS OF BRAZIL ANYWAY?

J. THE UNITED STATES IS TALKING ABOUT ASSURED FUEL
SUPPLIERS FOR BRAZIL AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL ENRICHING
FACILITIES. HOW CAN THE US ASSURE SUCH FUEL NOW WHEN IT
COULD NOT SIGN NEW FUEL CONTRACTS WITH BRAZIL IN 1974 AND HAS
NOT YET GIVEN AN EXPORT LICENSE FOR THE ANGRA I FUEL WHICH
HAS A FIRM CONTRACT?
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K. THE UNITED STATES SEEMS TO BE CONCERNED
ABOUT THE
TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO BRAZIL. IS IT THAT YOU DO NOT
BELIEVE WE COULD DEVELOP THESE THINGS OURSELVES, IF WE
NEED TO, AND DO YOU NOT REALIZE WE ARE ALREADY WORKING TOGETHER
WITH GERMANY TO PERFECT THE JET NOZZLE PROCESS?

L. WHAT STEP DOES THE US PLAN TO TAKE TO STOP THE
SPREAD OF THESE SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES (ENRICHMENT AND
REPROCESSING) IN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE ALREADY DONE RESEARCH
ON THEM (EG, GERMANY AND JAPAN OR TO STOP THE ACCUMULATION
OF PLUTONIUM IN COUNTRIES NOT IMPORTING SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES
(EG, ARGENTINA)?

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BRASILIA 1422

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M. THE US IS ARGUING THAT REPROCESSING OF SPENT FUEL IS NOT ESENTIAL FOR NUCLEAR POWER. THIS MAY BE TRUE FOR YOUR PRESENT REACTORS, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL OTHER COUNTRIES DO NOT NECESSARILY AGREE, BUT WHAT ABOUT FUTURE REACTORS -- THE BREEDER REACTOR WHICH DEPENDS ON PLUTONIUM OR REACTORS TO USE THE THORIUM WHICH IS BRAZIL'S LARGEST KNOWN NUCLEAR RESOURCE?

N. WHY IS IT THAT BRAZIL'S ACCESSION TO THE TLATE-LOLCO TRATY DOES NOT SATISFY THE US OF OUR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR INTENTIONS?

O. THE US APPROVED THE TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN 1976 AT IAEA AND AT THAT TIME MADE NO QUALIFYING STATEMENT OR RESERVATION. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE US DECIDED THAT THE SAFE-GUARDS WERE INSUFFICIENT. WHY DID THE US LOSE CONFIDENCE IN THE IAEA?

P. THE US FIRST BECAME AWARE OF THE PROPOSED FRG-BRAZIL DEAL SEVERAL MONTHS BEFORE IT WAS SIGNED BUT MADE NO STRONG EFFORT TO BLOCK THE AGREEMENT. FROM JUNE, 1975, WHEN THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED, UP UNTIL LATE LAST YEAR THE US DISPLAYED NO STRONG PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO THE ACCORD. THE US APPROVED THE TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS IN 1976 AND IN OCTOBER OF 1976 THE SECRETARY OF STATE WAS WIDELY QUOTED AS STATING THAT THE FRG-CONFIDENTIAL

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BRAZIL AGREEMENT WAS AN "ACCOMPLISHED FACT." HOW CAN THE US NOW MAKE THE NUCLEAR ACCORD AN ISSUE AFTER HAVING SO CLEARLY AND FREQUENTLY GIVEN ITS IMPLIED CONSENT?

Q. TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE US OPPOSITION TO THE FRG-BRAZIL DEAL RESPONSIVE TO ALLEGED CONCERN ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION THAT THE FRG WILL USE THE NUCLEAR ACCORD ULTIMATELY TO MAKE ITSELF A MAJOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS POWER?

R. WHILE THE US IS WORKING TO PREVENT HORIZONTAL PRO-LIFERATION, BY BLOCKING THE FRG-BRAZIL DEAL, WHAT IS IT DOING TO CURB VERTICAL PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS? WE ARE AWARE OF THE VARIOUS US-SOVIET PROPOSALS IN THIS FIELD, BUT WHAT IS THE US DOING OR PLANNING TO DO TO PREVENT VERTICAL PROLIFERATION BY NON-NPT COUNTRIES SUCH AS INDIA, FRANCE AND THE PRC?

S. HOW CAN THE US REFUSAL TO SIGN PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY OF TLATELOCO BE RECONCILED WITH THE HIGH PRIORITY IT NOW GIVES TO NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES?

T. IT HAS BEEN CHARGED THAT A BASIC OBJECTIVE OF CURRENT

US OPPOSITION TO THE SPREAD OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY IS TO PRESERVE A CARTEL FOR FUEL PROCESSING AND ENRICHMENT SERVICES, A "NUCLEAR FUEL OPEC." WHICH WOULD BE ABLE SUBSEQUENTLY TO FORCE UP RAPIDLY THE PRICE OF FUELS AND AS WELL AS ENJOY GREATER POLITICAL LEVERAGE OVER FUEL CONSUMER COUNTRIES? PLEASE COMMENT. HOW COULD THE CONSUMING COUNTRIES BE CERTAIN OF EQUITABLE AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT IF A CARTEL WERE ALLOWED TO DEVELOP?

U. IS THE US PRESSURING OTHER FUEL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, SUCH AS CANADA AND THE NETHERLANDS, TO INSIST THAT BRAZIL ADHERE TO THE NPT OR ACCEPT FULL-SCOP SAFEGUARDS?

V. BRAZIL'S TOP LEADERS HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSURED THAT BRAZIL DOES NOT INTEND TO BUILD NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND BRAZIL HAS FORSWORN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ADHERING TO THE TREATY OF TLAHELCO. BRAZIL'S HISTORY CONFIRMS THAT IT IS A NON-AGGRESSIVE, PEACE-LOVING NATURE. WHY DOESN'T THE US ACCEPT THESE ASSURANCES AS ADEQUATE? IF BRAZIL WERE TO SIGN THE NPT WOULD THE US BE ANY MORE WILLING TO PERMIT THE TRANSFER OF CONFIDENTIAL

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SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY?

5. POSSIBLE QUESTIONS UNRELATED TO THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WOULD BE THE FOLLOWING:

A. IS SECRETARY VANCE WILLING TO CONTINUE THE TWICE-YEARLY CONSULTATIVE TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA CALLED FOR UNDER THE 1976 MOU? DOES THE SECRETARY PLAN TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS ON MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST BY LETTER AS DONE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FOREIGN MINISTER SILVEIRA?

B. BRAZIL SUFFERS A SIZEABLE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT ON CURRENT ACCOUNT, AN IMPORTANT PART OF WHICH IS REPRESENTED BY A BILATERAL TRADE DEFICIT WITH THE US OF MORE THAN \$1 BILLION. IN VIEW OF THIS ADVANTAGEOUS TRADE RELATIONSHIP ENJOYED BY THE US, HOW CAN THE US JUSTIFY IMPOSING FURTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO BRAZILIAN EXPORTS AS IN THE CASE OF THE PROPOSED TARIFF QUOTA ON SHOE EXPORTS, COUNTERVAILING DUTIES OF SCISSORS AND SHEARS AND OTHER PRODUCTS, AND INCREASING RESISTANCE IN THE US TO THE FAVORABLE PRICES NOW BEING RECEIVED BY BRAZILIAN COFFEE EXPORTS?

C. IS THE US GOVERNMENT'S REPORT ON THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BRAZIL EXPECTED TO BE RELEASED SOON? WILL ITS CONCLUSIONS MAKE POSSIBLE FURTHER ADVERSE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION AGAINST BRAZIL?

D. WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST BRAZIL AND OTHER COUNTRIES THAT DO NOT MEASURE UP TO US HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS, AS SUGGESTED BY UN AMBASSADOR YOUNG? IS THE US CONSIDERING SUCH POSSIBILITIES, AS YOUNG SUGGESTED, AS DISCOURAGING INVESTMENT BY US FIRMS IN HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM COUNTRIES? WILL THE US GIVE MORE WEIGHT NOW TO HUMAN RIGHTS

CONSIDERATIONS IN DETERMINING ITS VOTE ON PROPOSED ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS OR LOANS BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH THE
US IS AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTOR?

E. DID THE DEPUTY SECRETARY DISCUSS THE US HUMAN RIGHTS
CONCERNS WITH SECRETARY SILVEIRA OR OTHER BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS
DURING HIS VISIT?
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F. DOES THE US INTEND TO APPLY THE SAME SANCTIONS AGAINST
ALL HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEM COUNTRIES, REGARDLESS OF POWER AND
IMPORTANCE, WHETHER CHILE, BRAZIL, IRAN OR THE SOVIET UNION?

6. WITH RESPECT TO BROADER PROBLEMS-- CUBA, PANAMA, ANGOLA,
SOUTH ATLANTIC, SOUTHERN AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST, RELATIONS WITH
THE USSR, ETC. -- WE EXPECT QUESTIONS TO BE OF THE STANDARD
TYPE WELL KNOWN TO THE DEPARTMENT.

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